feat: add admin consent endpoint for DIAL_NATIVE services - #1820
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An administrator approves an application's use of a DIAL-native service via
POST/DELETE /v1/applications/{appId}/external-services/{id}/consent. The
approval is a credential record in the APPLICATION-level slot — its existence
is the consent, the audit event records who decided. Because that slot holds
ordinary credentials while a service is OAUTH/API_KEY, any write that changes
a service's authentication_type now purges the old APPLICATION-level record,
so a leftover credential can never pass as an approval, and client secrets
are never carried across a type change. Consent operations are admin-only
and audited, including refusals.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both credential writes ended in the same encrypt + put sequence; extracted storeEncrypted so putCredentialsRecord and addResourceCredentials share it. Also pins with a test that the consent route and the management route can never cross-match: the service id disallows '/', both patterns are anchored, and even an app path containing an external-services segment or a service named 'consent' stays on its own route. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Part 3/4 of the offline-delegation split (replaces #1815). Based on #1819.
An administrator approves an application's use of a DIAL-native service via
POST/DELETE/v1/applications/{appId}/external-services/{id}/consent. The approval is a record in the APPLICATION-level credentials slot; the audit event records who decided. Any write that changes a service'sauthentication_typenow purges the old APPLICATION-level record, so a leftover credential can never pass as an approval. Admin-only, audited including refusals.🤖 Generated with Claude Code